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Scholars have long debated whether trade liberalization has positive or negative effects
on resource use and ecosystems. This study examines the conditions under which
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expansion was correlated with access to global market information via mobile phones.
Model simulations indicate that increased mobile phone saturation could expand fish-
ing effort sufficiently to deplete multiple marine species groups, while other species
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benefit from increased access to global market information.
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Fishing communities around the world confront crucial dilemmas in the face of
globalization. Trade liberalization may provide new opportunities for previously
isolated villages if they can gain access to global markets. However, without
careful management, such market entry may also interfere with long-term
resource sustainability and poverty reduction. This article addresses this
dilemma at the subnational level by studying ﬁshing behavior and ecosystem
shifts after trade liberalization, as well as possible interventions that moderate
these shifts. We examine how ﬁshers have changed their ﬁshing behavior (i.e., as
measured by ﬂeet size at the district level), in response to a discrete episode of
market liberalization.
Export markets were opened by a 2008 World Trade Organization (WTO)
decision forcing the United States to reduce anti-dumping duties imposed on
Indian shrimp. Exporters beneﬁted from these declining market barriers, but
little research has examined how global market signals reach primary, local
resource users and aﬀect their harvest decisions. In this article, we explore
ﬂeet size changes and then project how such shifts translate into ecosystem
eﬀects under diﬀerent resource management scenarios.
There is considerable debate over the environmental eﬀects of trade liberal-
ization (Esty, 2001). Some scholars argue that liberalized trade has detrimental
eﬀects on the environment due to increased production (Daly, 1993), which leads
to greater pressure on resources (Brewer, Cinner, Fisher, Green, & Wilson, 2012;
Shrivastava & Kothari, 2012), limits on domestic regulation (Porter, 1999), and
constraints on international environmental rules (Axelrod, 2011; Stilwell &
Tuerk, 1999). Others suggest that increased trade, by promoting stringent regu-
lation (Prakash & Potoski, 2006; Vogel, 1995) and raising living standards
(Bhagwati, 1993) that in turn promote livelihood diversiﬁcation (Cinner &
Bodin, 2010), reduces pressure on natural resources and increases sustainability
(de Soysa & Neumayer, 2005).
As with other resource users, ﬁshers’ response to trade liberalization is still in
question. Increased market access can potentially result in higher prices for ﬁsh
products (Schmitt & Kramer, 2010). Fishers may respond to price increases by
expanding ﬁshing ﬂeets (Barkin & DeSombre, 2013; Bort, 1987), assuming there
are no institutional constraints on such expansion, with the expectation to
garner greater proﬁts. In this scenario, further ecosystem degradation might
be expected to follow. Alternatively, greater certainty of reaching subsistence
income levels may lead to less ﬁshing or more cautious resource use. This scen-
ario could occur if market participants either focus on maintaining their liveli-
hoods for the long run or engage in alternative behaviors other than ﬁshing.
However, external disturbances such as global market shifts do not have a
homogenous eﬀect on ﬁshing behavior and coastal ecosystems. Rather, as we
demonstrate, ﬁshers’ responses to global market shifts are not uniform across
locations, indicating a need to identify the factors that allow trade liberalization
to trigger increased eﬀort and resulting ecological responses. Although some
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previous studies have suggested uniformly positive or negative eﬀects of trade
liberalization, we explore the conditions under which such market perturbations
lead to robust or vulnerable marine socioecological systems (SESs). We hypothe-
size that global market shifts have a greater impact on ﬁshing ﬂeets when ﬁshers
have greater access—via mobile phones—to market information. We assess how
ﬁshers and ﬁsh stocks respond to market liberalization, ﬁnding support for this
information access hypothesis using district-level data from India’s southern-
most states, Kerala and Tamil Nadu (TN). Furthermore, we ﬁnd that this rela-
tionship is particularly strong in the mechanized ﬁshing sector, whereas mobile
phone access is correlated with a shift away from nonmotorized artisanal ﬁshing.
This pattern suggests that information is necessary to reap short-term beneﬁts of
globalization, which are most clearly observed through increased capital expend-
iture. We then simulate the ecosystem impacts of such ﬂeet size changes under
diﬀerent management scenarios. These simulations demonstrate how commu-
nities may intervene to limit overexploitation of marine resources in the context
of market liberalization.
We proceed by reviewing recent literature on SES sustainability in the face of
market disturbances. We then develop and test the information access hypothesis,
using our statistical results to project substantive ecosystem impacts of market
liberalization and demonstrate how resource managers can mitigate these
impacts. Finally, we conclude by addressing the implications of our ﬁndings.
Theory
Coastal SES
SESs are complex linked systems in which social and ecological components mutu-
ally aﬀect each other. To understand how ﬁsh stocks and coastal communities
respond to disturbances such as trade liberalization, coastal ecological and social
systems must be considered together as interrelated parts of a coupled system
(Perry, Barange, & Ommer, 2010; The´baud et al., 2014). We recognize the long
history of coastal ecosystem collapse due to overﬁshing and natural
variation (Jackson et al., 2001) and do not suggest that coastal SESs remain in
stable states prior to external disturbance. Rather, this model provides a starting
point for examining systemic impacts of such disturbances independent of the prior
state.
In the coastal SES, ﬁshing eﬀort (i.e., ﬂeet size or ﬁshing hours) aﬀects avail-
able stocks (A, in Figure 1) because targeted species decline when individuals are
removed at rates greater than replacement (Walters, 2001). In addition to
targeted species, bycatch also aﬀects ﬁsh stocks. Shrimping has particularly
large impacts on marine ecosystems through benthic substrate trawl damage
(Watson, Revenga, & Kura, 2006) and bycatch (Venkataraman & Melkani,
2007). Worldwide, shrimp ﬁshermen discard an estimated 15 million tons of
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bycatch yearly, whereas all other ﬁshermen combined discard roughly 5 million
tons per year (Venkataraman & Melkani, 2007). Indian shrimp trawlers discard
up to 90% of their catch (Lobo, 2007; Venkataraman & Melkani, 2007).
Therefore, shrimp trawler ﬂeet expansion could have substantial eﬀects on
other marine species. Declining ﬁsh stocks then directly impact livelihoods, in
pre- and post-harvest sectors as well as ﬁshing households (B, in Figure 1;
Cinner, Daw, & McClanahan, 2009; International Collective in Support of
Fishworkers [ICSF], 2005).
Livelihood outcomes and ﬁsh abundance may then aﬀect vessel investment
in subsequent periods (C and D, in Figure 1), as people regularly evaluate
whether it is worthwhile to harvest ﬁsh—both in terms of the ﬂeet size
required to obtain the necessary catch and whether selling this catch will
meet ﬁnancial needs. Alternatively, ﬁshers may consider whether alternative
professions oﬀer better livelihood security (Coulthard, 2008). If they continue
ﬁshing, adaptation may involve adopting diﬀerent harvest methods or target-
ing species that are not (yet) depleted. These strategies may lead to further
ecosystem degradation even if livelihoods are protected in the short term
(Essington, Beaudreau, & Wiedenmann, 2006; Pauly, Christensen,
Dalsgaard, Froese, & Torres, 1998).
Overuse of natural resources, including overﬁshing, is a proximate driver of
ecological change (Brewer, Cinner, Green, & Pressey, 2012). Others note,
however, that commons management solutions provide incentives for cooper-
ation to avoid disastrous consequences (Berkes, 2006; Ostrom, 1990). Indeed, in
coastal systems, ﬁsheries managers try to balance social and ecological goals
Figure 1. Sample coastal socioecological system schematic, showing how interventions
moderate the impact of external disturbances such as global market shifts.
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through rules and regulations (i.e., institutions), many of which aim to limit
ﬁshing eﬀort (e.g., vessel limitations, temporal restrictions, etc.) and positively
impact ﬁsh stocks and livelihoods in the long term. These institutions exist at
local, national, or international levels and often provide incentives to reduce
overﬁshing. As a result, feedback from stocks and livelihoods to future eﬀort
(i.e., ﬂeet size; C and D, in Figure 1) is constrained by institutional arrangements
in place for that particular area.
Adaptive governance represents feedback from current ecological conditions
and livelihoods to management decisions at the same scale (E and F, in
Figure 1). When managers realize that available management options do not
achieve desired outcomes, they may try to adjust rules to maximize certain goals
(Olsson, Folke, & Berkes, 2004). We address one situation in which such infor-
mation may be used to improve management interventions.
Adaptive governance may address internal perturbations to the SES.
However, as external perturbations—such as market shifts—are introduced,
they may still alter relationships within the SES (Schoon & Cox, 2012). A
wide range of interacting external disturbances may exist, including regional
credit arrangements (Crona, Nystro¨m, Folke, & Jiddawi, 2010), national-level
policies such as ﬁshing subsidies (Pauly, 2002), global market shifts (Young
et al., 2006), and natural disturbances such as disasters (Hughes, Bellwood,
Folke, Steneck, & Wilson, 2005) or climate change (Allison et al., 2009).
These external disturbances (G, in Figure 1) raise the specter of linkages
across social and ecological systems operating at multiple levels. Community-
level SESs are adjacent to other communities and may be nested within regional,
national, and international systems as well.
Market Perturbations as Systemic Disturbances
As communities begin to rely on other locales for production inputs and
consumer markets, resource ﬂows increase, thereby disturbing communities’
traditional uses of local natural resources (A to F, in Figure 1; Gadgil &
Guha, 1993). As a result, the system to be governed then extends beyond trad-
itional governance system boundaries, particularly in the context of ﬁshing vil-
lages that previously governed themselves as closed social systems (Bavinck &
Salagrama, 2008), even though related ecological systems were always connected
at larger scales. Thus, as the scale of social activities expands, some scholars
suggest that the system faces increased pressure (Young et al., 2006), including
expanded global seafood demand (Smith et al., 2010). Fishers often respond to
increased demand by expanding eﬀort through market entry and vessel invest-
ment (Iwasaki & Shaw, 2009), though market processes are moderated by
barriers to international trade (Salim & Biradar, 2009).
Trade liberalization provides one potential disturbance by increasing incen-
tives for producers, including ﬁshers, to further exploit resources for which
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demand has increased (Brewer, Cinner, Fisher, et al., 2012; Rock, 1996;
Shrivastava & Kothari, 2012). These consequences of market liberalization
may be intensiﬁed because decision makers often subordinate ﬁsheries manage-
ment decisions to other policy objectives such as economic development (Graﬀ
Zivin & Damon, 2012).
However, other scholars suggest that disturbances may instead provide an
opportunity for increased resilience, opening the possibility of adaptation by ﬁnd-
ing more eﬃcient and sustainable resource exploitation methods (Young et al.,
2006). In particular, some ﬁnd that market liberalization may promote stringent
regulation to meet wealthy consumer preferences (Garcia-Johnson, 2000; Prakash
& Potoski, 2006; Vogel, 1995; Zeng & Eastin, 2012). In addition, increased com-
petition may lead to more eﬃcient production and therefore increased resource
sustainability (de Soysa & Neumayer, 2005). Regulation and competition may
limit or balance against the ecological impacts of increased ﬁshing.
Moving beyond this simple dichotomy, some scholars ﬁnd that ﬁsh trade has
more ambiguous impacts on economic development (Be´ne´, Lawton, & Allison,
2010), and therefore ﬁshing decisions. As Folke (2006) notes, the charge for
scholars is to identify what conditions facilitate successful adaptation to disturb-
ance. Indeed, others show that response to global market signals varies based on
local institutions and socioeconomic factors (Garrett & Lange, 1996; Rudra &
Jensen, 2011), providing an opportunity to analyze speciﬁc conditions that pro-
mote SES sustainability in the face of disturbance (Perry et al., 2010).
Nonetheless, most vulnerability studies address only national-level variation
(e.g., Allison et al. 2009), despite within-country behavioral variation
(Bavinck, 1998; Castello, McGrath, Arantes, & Almeida, 2013; Coulthard,
2008). In the next section, we examine information access as a possible cause
of this variation.
Explaining Fishing Response Variation
When trade liberalization increases market access, exporters expect higher prices
due to increased demand. In turn, exporters may be willing to pay producers
(i.e., ﬁshers) more for each unit due to increased competition for available ﬁsh
(Schmitt & Kramer, 2010). While ﬁshers do not export their product directly,
they negotiate prices for their catch, often with middlemen who sell on to pro-
cessors and/or exporters. Therefore, when ﬁshers are aware of increased export
prices, they may be able to negotiate higher sale prices, possibly incentivizing
increased ﬁshing.
This sequence of responses to trade liberalization relies on assumptions of
eﬃcient markets, including ﬁshers’ access to market information. However,
information is often scarce and unevenly distributed in rural areas, particularly
in developing countries. When ﬁshers are unaware of price shifts, they do not
have an opportunity to gain greater prices for their products. As a result,
320 Journal of Environment & Development 24(3)
 by guest on August 12, 2015jed.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
resource harvesters with information access will likely obtain higher prices than
those without (Stigler, 1961), meaning that we should see greater behavioral
responses (i.e., ﬂeet expansion) in the presence of market information.
Therefore, we anticipate that trade liberalization will increase resource use
only when ﬁshers are aware of price changes.
Mobile phones are one tool for bridging information gaps. Recent studies
show that mobile phones play an important role in marine governance coordin-
ation (Hoefnagel, de Vos, & Buisman, 2013). Overa˚ (2006) ﬁnds that mobile
phone usage also decreases transaction costs and increases trust throughout agri-
cultural supply chains by increasing the frequency of interactions. They may also
make agricultural and ﬁshing work easier by supporting extension work, provid-
ing weather information, and facilitating emergency rescue (Mittal, Gandhi, &
Tripathi, 2010). More important, for our purposes, mobile phones may allow
producers to engage in price arbitrage by providing information that allows them
to negotiate among multiple buyers (Aker & Mbiti, 2010). Such a technique is
particularly important for perishable goods where information must be trans-
mitted quickly before the harvest spoils (Muto & Yamano, 2009).
Similarly, mobile phones should allow ﬁshers to acquire market information
and negotiate accordingly with exporters and their agents, particularly in regions
such as South India that are characterized by monopsony (Sathyapalan,
Srinivasan, & Scholtens, 2008). As a result, when mobile phones are available,
scholars observe greater competition and price convergence in Indian coastal
ﬁsheries (Jensen, 2007). Under these conditions, price increases may inﬂuence
ﬁsher incomes and therefore ﬁshing ﬂeet investments. We therefore hypothesize
that trade liberalization increases ﬂeet size more when ﬁshers have greater access
to information through mobile phones. Fleet size increases can be observed both
in terms of overall number of vessels, as well as the shift from artisanal boats to
mechanized vessels that can harvest larger quantities of marine resources per
vessel. If this hypothesis is accurate, then we should observe a greater impact of
trade liberalization on ﬂeet size in areas with greater mobile saturation.
Conversely, if mobile phones lead to better ﬁsheries management and reduced
wastage as Jensen (2007) and Abraham (2007) suggest, then mobile phone access
may reduce ﬂeet size in the presence of market access if ﬁshers wish to achieve a
certain level of income rather than maximizing proﬁt. In the next section, we test
the explanatory value of mobile phone saturation on ﬂeet sizes.
Research Methods—Analyzing Indian Fisheries in the
Face of Market Liberalization
Study Period and Location
To test the information access hypothesis, we examine ﬂeet size changes in light
of a particular trade liberalization episode. We focus on the presence and
Axelrod et al. 321
 by guest on August 12, 2015jed.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
removal of protectionist measures placed against Indian shrimp by the United
States. Fisheries are a key economic development sector in India (Thorpe, Reid,
van Anrooy, & Brugere, 2005). Shrimping dominates the Indian seafood export
market such that shrimp alone compose over 60% of India’s total marine ﬁsh
exports by value (Marine Products Export Development Authority [MPEDA],
2014). While shrimp are relatively abundant in Indian coastal waters, shrimping
may impact broader marine ecosystems as discussed earlier.
After becoming India’s main shrimp export market, the United States
accused India and others of dumping shrimp on the U.S. market at less than
fair market price. In response, the United States instituted anti-dumping duties
on shrimp imports from India in 2004. India successfully petitioned the World
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body (WTO DSB) to overturn these
duties in 2008. The United States complied with the ruling and decreased
duties on Indian shrimp imports from 10.17% to 0.79% over a 1-year period
(Punnathara, 2009b). As a consequence, the market for Indian shrimp experi-
enced a discrete episode of market access liberalization in late 2008 and early
2009, allowing us to examine impacts by comparing ﬁshing ﬂeet size before and
after this event.
The 2004 anti-dumping duties had a major impact on Indian shrimp exports
to the United States. Following a steady rise from 1996 to 2003, the period of
anti-dumping duties (2004–2008) demonstrates a continuous decline in shrimp
imports from India, despite an almost continuous—though shallow—increase in
total U.S. shrimp imports from other countries (e.g., Ecuador, Indonesia, and
Malaysia) over that period (Figure 2). In monetary terms, Indian shrimp exports
to the United States declined from $409 million in 2003 (before duties were
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Figure 2. U.S. shrimp imports from selected countries and overall, 1996–2013.
Source. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service (Retrieved from http://www.ers.usda.
gov/data-products/aquaculture-data.aspx).
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enacted) to $142 million in 2008, the year in which WTO DSB found U.S. duties
unacceptable. Despite a slight 2010 rise in duties, 2010–2011 data indicate a
return to the trend of increasing shrimp imports from India to the United
States, to $452 million (Salim & Narayanakumar, 2012). U.S. imports have
long provided the largest market for Indian shrimp. Indeed, though exports to
the United States declined steeply while the duties were in place, the United
States remained the top purchaser of Indian shrimp (by volume) until 2007–
2008 when Japanese imports surpassed the U.S. market for 3 years. Anecdotal
news reports suggest that the increased U.S. exports in 2010–2011 and beyond
were appreciated by the industry, stating that “the saving grace for [export to]
the US market remains the successive slashing of the anti-dumping duties, which
has enabled the Indian shrimp exporters to hold their own in the ﬁercely com-
petitive US markets” (Punnathara, 2009a).
Although overall Indian seafood exports continued to grow during the 2004–
2008 period, the rate of growth slowed considerably, sharply expanding again
after the 2009–2010 ﬁscal year (MPEDA, 2014). As such, demand for Indian
shrimp (the largest portion of India’s seafood exports) appears to have shifted
along with the changing U.S. duties.1 Our goal is to determine how such demand
shifts aﬀect ﬂeet size and therefore ecosystem responses, and what factors con-
dition this eﬀect. Domestic demand for shrimp in India remains relatively low,
with imports less than 0.005% of exports on average between 2000 and 2011
(India Department of Commerce Export-Import Data Bank). As a result, ﬁshers
do not compete locally with foreign producers, meaning that prices should pri-
marily rise with expanded access to United States and other markets.
Data
This study responds to calls for research on the relationships between market,
ﬁshing, and ecosystem dynamics. We therefore analyze district-level ﬂeet size for
each vessel type, and ﬁshery-independent biomass data collected by India’s
Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute (CMFRI). We ﬁrst compare
2007–2011 ﬂeet size changes across districts and vessel types (nonmotorized,
motorized, mechanized) in India’s southernmost states, Kerala (9 districts)
and TN (12 districts—CMFRI combines data from adjacent districts
Thiruvarur and Thanjavur; see Map 1). These states are major shrimp produ-
cers, accounting for 12% (Kerala) and 8% (TN) of India’s crustacean landings
in 2004–2011. Together, there are 21 districts, with up to three vessel types
(nonmotorized artisanal boats, motorized artisanal boats, and vessels with
mechanized ﬁshing gear) in each district. Therefore, we have a total of 63 pos-
sible observations. However, some are dropped in each analysis due to missing
covariate data or lack of a particular vessel type in certain districts (Table 1).
Our dependent variable is the change in district-level ﬂeet size by vessel type
over the period 2007 (i.e., the last full year before U.S. duties were reduced) to
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2011 (by which time vessel investments would have fully responded to the duty
reduction).2 Fleet size ismeasured on an annual basis as the number of active ﬁshing
units of each type in that year. We reached similar results as those below when
replacing ﬂeet size with the number of ﬁshing hours by vessel type in each district.
Once we specify the model estimates, we use CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg,
& King, 2001) to simulate how mobile phone access moderates responses to
global market shifts (G, in Figure 1). CLARIFY uses Monte Carlo simulation
to predict how ﬂeet size and composition will change when one explanatory
variable shifts values and all others are held at their mean. This simulation
does not add additional ﬁndings but helps to interpret the magnitude of
mobile phones’ eﬀects on ﬁshing eﬀort. Furthermore, having established this
Map 1. Coastal districts of Tamil Nadu (green) and Kerala (blue), India.
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likely level of ﬂeet size change, we can then use Ecopath with Ecosim (EwE) to
simulate how such increased ﬁshing will impact ﬁsh stocks (A, in Figure 1) under
diﬀerent management scenarios (Christensen & Walters, 2004).
In response to trade liberalization, shifts in ﬂeet size vary by district and vessel
type in both Kerala and TN (Figure 3). For instance, while the Kanyakumari
district (TN) motorized ﬁshing ﬂeet follows the pattern one might expect based
on overall export trends, nonmotorized ﬁshing in Kanyakumari declined over
the same period, and the mechanized ﬂeet declined but eventually began to
recover (Figure 3(a)). In contrast, Alappuzha district (Kerala) demonstrates
rising motorized and nonmotorized ﬂeets while the duties were in place, followed
by declines after markets opened. This variation demonstrates that response to
global market shifts is not uniform across districts or vessel types. The remainder
of this article analyzes the causes of this variation.
Our key independent variable is information access. This factor is measured
at the district level by the mean number of mobile phones per family in coastal
areas (i.e., mobile saturation). This measure is drawn from CMFRI’s 2010
Marine Fisheries Census (CMFRI, 2010), a survey of all Indian marine ﬁshing
villages.3 Seventy-one percent of respondents were active ﬁshermen, with
another 25% working in allied professions such as boat construction and ﬁsh
vending. There is no reason to believe that ﬁshermen’s mobile phone use was any
diﬀerent than others within their communities. Furthermore, Indian mobile
phone spectrum allocation (and therefore geographic location of cell towers)
Table 1. Summary Statistics.
Variable Source
# of
Observations M SD Range
Expected influ-
ence on fleet size
DV: Fleet size
change (2007–
2011)
CMFRI 56 0.29 1.81 1, 10.89 N/A
IV: Mobiles per
family
Marine Fisheries
Census (MFC)
63 0.44 0.20 0.17, 0.92 +
Preservation
infrastructure
facilities per
village
MFC 63 1.04 1.12 0, 4.10 +
Educational
institutions
per family
MFC 63 0.0061 0.0047 0.0013,
0.021
+
CPUE change
(2007–2011)
CMFRI 51 0.57 2.11 1, 11.10 +
Note. CMFRI¼Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute; CPUE¼ catch per unit effort.
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was driven by political connections,4 while individual phone use is an inexpen-
sive capital investment (Doron & Jeﬀrey, 2013) or occasionally driven by exten-
sion organization donations (MSSRF gets award for ﬁshermen mobile app,
2014). Therefore, mobile phone saturation is not dependent on community
wealth or other potential explanatory variables.5
If the information access hypothesis is accurate, then the change in ﬂeet size
should be greater in districts with greater mobile phone saturation.6 In addition,
these districts should demonstrate greater shifts away from artisanal (especially
nonmotorized) ﬁshing toward more capital-intensive mechanized vessels to cap-
ture the newfound beneﬁts of market access. This shift may occur through three
distinct behavioral responses: (a) investment in mechanized vessels, if artisanal
ﬁshermen have gained funding via collective savings, subsidies, development aid,
(a)
(b)
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Figure 3. Fleet size in (a) Kanyakumari (TN) and (b) Alappuzha (Kerala) districts, 2007–
2011.
Source. CMFRI.
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or loans; (b) previously artisanal ﬁshermen working as crew members on
mechanized vessels; or (c) increasing competition causes artisanal ﬁshermen to
exit the profession while outsiders invest in mechanized vessels. This study does
not distinguish between these possible responses, nor can we diﬀerentiate based
on the type of market information (e.g., price information, buyer interest, etc.)
ﬁshers derive from mobile phones.
To ensure that these outcomes were not driven by other factors, we control
for other district-level characteristics. First, we assess availability of ﬁsh preser-
vation infrastructure (ice factories, cold storages, and freezing plants) because
these facilities should facilitate long-distance trade necessary to participate in
export markets. Farmers who sell nonperishable crops (e.g., maize) seem to start
with an advantage in global markets (Muto & Yamano, 2009). Therefore, dis-
tricts with preservation facilities may already beneﬁt from market shifts due to
their ability to wait for preferred market conditions. As such, we expect that
preservation facilities allow ﬁshers to take advantage of improved market access
and are therefore correlated with increased ﬂeet size over this time period.
Second, we control for the number of educational institutions per family as a
proxy for ﬁshers’ opportunities to adapt by changing livelihoods. Such oppor-
tunities should allow ﬁshers to exit the profession when market access (and
therefore price) is low, with some returning as market prospects improve.
Therefore, we anticipate that ﬂeet size will increase more over this period for
those with greater access to education. Both infrastructure and educational
measures are available from the 2010 Marine Fisheries Census.
Third, we control for changing catch per unit eﬀort (CPUE) over this time
period. CPUE serves as a proxy for ecosystem health because it provides a
measure of the ﬁsh available in a given area. We expect that—all else
equal—a declining ﬁshery leads to less ﬂeet investment, while greater ﬁsh abun-
dance leads more people to enter the profession (Cinner et al., 2009), leading us
to anticipate a positive correlation between exogenously driven CPUE change
and changes in ﬂeet size. This measure allows us to control for the impact of
ecosystem health, as well as its eﬀect on livelihoods, on subsequent ﬁshing deci-
sions (B, C, and D, in Figure 1). Unfortunately, CPUE data are not available for
all observations, so we also present models without this measure for comparison.
Fourth, we control for state by using a dichotomous indicator to separate
districts in TN (1) from those in Kerala (0). The state may impact ﬂeet invest-
ment for geographic or political reasons due to diﬀerences in East and West
Coast ﬁsheries as well as state-level ﬁshing regulations. We have no a priori
expectation regarding the inﬂuence of state characteristics on ﬂeet size shifts.
Finally, we control for craft type to assess whether ﬂeet changes vary depend-
ing on the vessel type, which also usually correlates with wealth (e.g., nonmo-
torized craft require lower investment than mechanized trawlers). Kurien (1998)
explains that small-scale ﬁshers respond diﬀerently to globalization than indus-
trial ﬂeets do. Similarly, De Lopez (2002) notes that behavioral responses to
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market liberalization often vary by wealth, and Cinner et al. (2009) show that
the poor have more diﬃculty mobilizing to shift professions so they may be
stuck in the sector despite shifting market conditions. Shrivastava and
Kothari (2012) further suggest that poorer communities cannot access the eco-
nomic beneﬁts of export market access in India. If the wealth explanation is
accurate, then nonmotorized ﬁshers will have the weakest—yet still posi-
tive—response to global market changes, while mechanized ﬁshers will adapt
to these conditions most directly. Alternatively, we may see diﬀerent responses
based on vessel type because increased investment may shift ﬁshing from non-
motorized toward mechanized vessels. In this case, all ﬁshermen within a district
should respond to market changes, leading to a decline in nonmotorized ﬁshing
and a simultaneous rise in mechanized ﬁshing, with little net response in the
motorized sector as nonmotorized ﬁshermen invest in motors and motorized
ﬁshers seek employment on new mechanized vessels. In addition to the full
model, we also therefore partitioned the model to see if market responses
diﬀer depending on vessel type.
Table 1 includes summary statistics for all variables used in this study.
Variance inﬂation factors (VIF) were calculated for each variable in each regres-
sion model to ensure that collinearity did not aﬀect results. No VIF exceeded
3.5, well below the standard level of concern when a VIF exceeds 10.
Nonetheless, preservation infrastructure and state account for the greatest
level of collinearity among independent variables, with Kerala districts likely
to have more infrastructure available. Therefore, all models were also examined
when dropping these two variables independently. Direction, signiﬁcance, and
magnitude of results do not change appreciably, other than increased signiﬁ-
cance for the remaining one of these two variables.
To assess the information access hypothesis, we conducted multilevel and
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Table 2, which includes observations
from all three vessel types, uses gllamm software with robust standard errors and
adaptive quadrature in Stata 10 (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, & Pickles, 2005). This
multilevel model is necessary because multiple vessel types are present within each
district, with some of our key explanatory variables measured at the district level
(e.g., mobile phone saturation) and not varying by vessel type (Moulton, 1986).
As a result, this analysis considers variables at two levels (i.e., vessel type and
district). Table 3 includes separate OLS models for each vessel type.
Results
Results are presented in Table 2 (multilevel model, all observations) and Table 3
(OLS models diﬀerentiated by vessel type). Despite the small number of obser-
vations, mobile phone saturation has a positive eﬀect on district-level ﬂeet size
changes during the period when U.S. import duties were removed. This eﬀect is
not statistically signiﬁcant for the full multilevel Model 1 (b 1.64, p .200).
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However, the results indicate an increase in motorized (b 0.65, p .012) and
mechanized (b 0.67, p .069) vessels relative to nonmotorized vessels over the
period in question. This result suggests that there may be a shift from nonmo-
torized ﬁshing to mechanized eﬀort in these conditions, and Table 3 further
explores conditions correlated with this relationship. Model 2, which does not
control for CPUE, demonstrates similar results, with a larger coeﬃcient and
Table 2. Factors Predicting District-Level Fleet Size Change, 2007–2011 (multilevel models
using gllamm with robust standard errors in STATA 10).
Variable
(1)
Full
model
(2)
Without CPUE
control variable
(3)
Removed
observations
lacking CPUE data
Mobiles per family 1.64 2.37** 1.59*
(1.3) (1.1) (1.20)
Preservation infrastructure facilities
per village
0.21 0.47** 0.21
(0.13) (0.21) (0.14)
Educational institutions per family 35.2 110.7** 33.8
(33.9) (52.3) (32.6)
CPUE change (2007–2011) 0.016
(0.05)
Motorized sector 0.65** 0.57** 0.65**
(0.26) (0.25) (0.25)
Mechanized sector 0.67* 1.22* 0.68*
(0.37) (0.69) (0.38)
Tamil Nadu 0.14 0.55 0.13
(0.32) (0.48) (0.32)
Constant 0.97** 0.82* 0.97*
(0.49) (0.43) (0.51)
Variance at Level 1 (Residual) 0.15 0.21 0.15
Variance at Level 2 (District) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total variance 0.15 0.21 0.15
Observations (N) 50 56 50
Number of districts 21 21 21
Log-likelihood 72.1 105.3 72.2
Note. SE in parentheses. CPUE¼ catch per unit effort.
*p< .1.
**p< .05.
***p<.01.
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greater signiﬁcance for the explanatory variable of interest, mobile phone sat-
uration (b 2.37, p .026). Removing observations without CPUE data (Model
3) produces results more similar to Model 1, with a smaller coeﬃcient and lower
signiﬁcance for the mobile phone saturation variable than in Model 2 (b 1.59,
p .084). The similarity between Models 1 and 3 suggests that Model 1’s limi-
tations likely result from skipped observations rather than any substantive limi-
tation of the CPUE control variable. Therefore, we report results both with and
without this control variable for the vessel-speciﬁc models in Table 3.
To explore whether information access eﬀects vary by vessel type, we parti-
tion the model. Table 3 presents separate OLS models for each vessel type. Due
to the small number of observations for each vessel type (maximum of 21 dis-
tricts), we also conducted post hoc power analyses to determine how much these
regressions can tell us about the inﬂuence of mobile phones on ﬂeet size.
Nonmotorized vessel users reduced their active ﬂeets as mobile saturation
increased, though the result is not statistically signiﬁcant when all controls are
included in Model 4 (b0.70, p .42). However, when additional observa-
tions are included by dropping the CPUE variable, the mobile phone coeﬃcient
is statistically signiﬁcant while remaining negative (b1.58, p .048). In con-
trast, mechanized ﬂeet size increased signiﬁcantly with mobile saturation
(b 4.92, p .066; and b 8.32, p .041 without the CPUE control), while
motorized ﬁshing demonstrates a statistically insigniﬁcant decline with mobile
phone saturation (b0.42, p .74). This result is consistent with the expect-
ation that nonmotorized ﬁshing would decline and mechanized ﬁshing would
increase in the face of knowledge about market access, suggesting a decision to
invest in more capital-intensive vessel types with knowledge of market changes.
Together, these results suggest that information access may trigger a shift from
nonmotorized to mechanized ﬁshing as Kurien (1998) anticipates. Figure 4 com-
pares the substantive relationship between district-level mobile phone saturation
and ﬂeet size changes in the nonmotorized and mechanized sectors, using
Models 5 and 9.
Using CLARIFY software, we simulated the substantive impact of particu-
lar mobile saturation levels on ﬂeet size changes by vessel type. These simu-
lated ﬂeet changes can then be used to simulate impacts of ﬁshing changes on
ﬁsh biomass. In the mechanized sector (Model 9), which has the greatest
impact on ﬁsheries, if every district had the lowest observed level of district
mobile phone saturation among ﬁsherfolk ( 17%), the model predicts a 136%
decline in ﬂeet size over this period despite the strengthened export market. In
contrast, if every district reached the highest level of mobile saturation (92%)
with other factors at mean levels, the simulation predicts a 478% increase in
mechanized ﬁshing ﬂeets over this period. Nonmotorized ﬂeets (Model 5)
experience the opposite shifts under these conditions, with ﬂeet size 4%
higher under the low information scenario and 111% lower with high
mobile saturation.
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To understand how such ﬂeet changes actually aﬀect shrimp and other
species, we used EwE to simulate how the Arabian Sea ecosystem near India’s
West Coast would respond to altered shrimping behavior. We used EwE, with a
model developed using ﬁshery-independent biomass data for the Arabian Sea
(Mohamed, Zacharia, Muthiah, Abdurahiman, & Nayak, 2008) and used
CLARIFY to examine the Kerala-speciﬁc (i.e., Arabian Sea coast) impacts of
increased (92%) mobile phone saturation. In this scenario, nonmotorized ﬂeet
size declines 89% (i.e., to 11% of the previous ﬂeet size), while the mechanized
ﬂeet expands 591% (i.e., 6.91 previous levels). We then used EwE to explore
how the expanded ﬂeet would aﬀect other marine life, both through bycatch and
food web eﬀects. First, we simulated what would happen if the ﬂeet simply
expanded to catch additional shrimp without other policy changes. In this
model, changes take eﬀect in Year 10. Most of the biomass pools stabilize
within 10 years after increased mechanized ﬁshing and decreased nonmotorized
ﬁshing (i.e., Year 20 overall), without other behavior changes (column 1 in
Table 4, Figure 5(a)). The model suggests that this expanded shrimping ﬂeet
will result in substantial declines, including near depletion of benthic pelagic
species, medium benthic carnivores and benthic omnivores, and greater than
-
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Figure 4. Predicted change in fleet size (2007–2011) for nonmotorized and mechanized
vessels, based on district-level mobile phone saturation.
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40% declines among a number of other groups. These declines suggest that
market liberalization and vessel type shifts will indeed trigger negative ecosystem
responses when ﬁshers have access to market information. In the age of infor-
mation availability, such increased ﬁshery exploitation may harm smaller ﬁsh-
ermen and natural resources more generally (Doron & Jeﬀrey, 2013; Shrivastava
& Kothari, 2012). At the same time, some species groups, including economic-
ally important clupeids and mackerel, may actually increase under these condi-
tions as their predators decline.
Table 4. Simulated Ecosystem Effects After 10 Years of Increased Kerala Shrimp Fleets:
Fishers Increase Mechanized Single-Day Fleet to Increase Shrimp Effort by 591%, While
the Nonmotorized Fleet Declines by 89%.
No additional
behavior changes
Fishermen able to
target shrimp without
bycatch
1. Marine mammals 0.56753993 0.873505592
2. Sharks 0.113387041 0.990224063
3. Skates and rays 0.339167267 1.173226833
4. Large pelagics 0.590129077 1.001246452
5. Tunas 1.099603295 0.792211235
6. Cephalopods 0.886235535 0.89329654
7. Large benthopelagics 0.035418235 0.946228921
8. Large benthic carnivores 0.529301822 0.987645507
9. Medium benthic carnivores 7.95E-08 0.959467053
10. Small benthic carnivores 0.851374388 1.033620119
11. Small benthopelagics 1.25430429 0.955374599
12. Mackerel 1.197243929 1.058695316
13. Clupeids 1.307017088 1.047351003
14. Anchovies 1.020685554 1.041407347
15. Crab and lobsters 1.237426877 1.02022624
16. Shrimps 0.77938658 0.800370038
17. Benthic ominvores 1.23E-19 1.002559423
18. Heterotrophic benthos 1.032538652 1.00316298
19. Meiobenthos 1.006228089 1.001912951
20. Micronekton 1.018155336 0.990528882
21. Largezoo 0.99256742 1.011546135
22. Microzooplankton 0.999395549 0.994382083
23. Phytoplankton 0.9982481 1.001868248
24. Detritus 0.99870187 1.000449538
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We also simulate the same increased shrimp catch under conditions where
shrimp can be speciﬁcally targeted by the ﬂeet (i.e., when bycatch does not
deplete other marine species). By using “more target oriented” gear, this scenario
would allow successful ﬁshermen to continue harvesting shrimp while limiting
harm to other ﬁshery resources (Kurien, 1998, p. 29). In this simulation, negative
eﬀects can be moderated by regulatory measures designed to limit ecosystem
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Figure 5. Simulated ecosystem effects of increased Kerala shrimp fleets: Fishers increase
mechanized single-day fleet to increase shrimp effort by 591%, while the nonmotorized
fleet declines by 89% (a), with the ability to target shrimp (b).
334 Journal of Environment & Development 24(3)
 by guest on August 12, 2015jed.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
damage. As the second column of Table 4 and Figure 5(b) demonstrate, under
these conditions, no species group declines more than 20% from its previous
biomass. In addition, clupeids, mackerel, and other beneﬁciaries of predator
removal remain advantaged—though by a smaller margin—in this scenario.
Therefore, when ﬁshermen can target the lucrative shrimp species for harvest
without bycatch, we project that increased shrimp catch has little impact on
other species while still allowing ﬁshers to take advantage of shrimp market
changes. As a result, trade liberalization could retain its positive income beneﬁts
while still yielding more benign ecosystem impacts, if bycatch can be limited
through management eﬀorts such as gear restrictions or bycatch reduction
devices.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our results suggest that ﬁshers respond to economic opportunities when they are
aware of market changes. We demonstrate that the impacts of globalization are
moderated by vessel type and access to information rather than uniformly
increasing or decreasing resource use in the face of market liberalization.
Districts with greater access to market information via mobile phones are
more likely to increase ﬁshing and shift from artisanal to mechanized ﬁshing
in response to globalization. Although our ﬁndings are consistent across mul-
tiple model speciﬁcations, they are limited by a lack of temporal variation in
data collected for our key explanatory variable. Future studies could be
strengthened by additional time series data collection.
Nonetheless, this outcome suggests that those who are endowed with techno-
logical resources are best positioned to gain from globalization in the short term.
As Jensen (2007) and Abraham (2007) have similarly demonstrated, mobile
phone use improves ﬁshers’ access to market information. As they both note,
such information may lead to price convergence and reduced wastage. However,
while reduced wastage may increase the amount of ﬁsh sold and thereby enhance
ﬁshers’ livelihoods, we have no reason to believe that increased sales would lead
ﬁshermen to catch less if they are proﬁt maximizing actors who wish to sell the
additional ﬁsh rather than leaving them in the sea. Indeed, Jensen (2007, p. 914)
demonstrates that mobile phones increased the quantity sold rather than
decreasing the quantity caught. As a result, we have no reason to believe that
reduced waste would balance out the ecosystem impacts of increased ﬁshing
because the waste reduction does not lead to reduced catch.
While resource users may obtain short-term beneﬁts from ﬂeet expansion,
increased resource use may have detrimental long-term development eﬀects if
it negatively aﬀects resource sustainability and leads to overcapitalization of
ﬁshing vessels or gear. Indeed, increased ﬁshing capacity may lead ﬁshers to
put forth additional eﬀort to recoup their investment (Kurien, 1998). In this
case, expanded mechanized ﬂeets could have substantial negative eﬀects on
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the ecosystem beyond only increased shrimp exploitation, with the potential for
signiﬁcant declines in multiple species groups.
Nonetheless, local institutions may also condition the impact of external
market shifts on natural resources (Rudra & Jensen, 2011). Li (2005), for
instance, ﬁnds that trade expansion would lead to dirty economic growth in
Thailand unless environmental measures were simultaneously pursued.
Similarly, while trade liberalization may yield overexploitation in open-access
ﬁsheries, restricted access may lead to positive welfare eﬀects of trade liberal-
ization at the national level (Nielsen, 2009). Similarly, we ﬁnd that when
increased vessel investments are also matched with increased regulation, nega-
tive consequences may be mitigated. In particular, we demonstrate that bycatch
reduction would increase the sustainability of many species groups in Indian
coastal ﬁsheries without damaging those groups (e.g., clupeids and mackerel)
that may beneﬁt from removal of predators. However, this type of regulation
comes at a cost. Bhatta (2002) notes that “poor ﬁsherm[e]n of India cannot
aﬀord to harvest shrimp by adopting turtle excluding devices” (p. 18).
However, this option may become possible when oﬀset by increased incomes
or with government or foreign assistance. Our results therefore suggest that
institutional and technological interventions can also moderate the negative
impacts of increased production while still maintaining the short-term develop-
mental beneﬁts of information access and market liberalization. As such, infor-
mation access coupled with regulation could provide a means to manage the
impact of globalization on ﬁsheries, increasing the social beneﬁts of increased
catch while limiting negative ecological and livelihood eﬀects.
While our analysis supports the information access hypothesis, future
research should also examine the regulatory measures that are already in place
and under what conditions they have most successfully limited the negative
repercussions of trade liberalization while maintaining short-term livelihood
beneﬁts. Other research demonstrates that ﬁsheries rules are most eﬀective at
constraining adaptation strategies when they rely on a combination of state
regulation and local norms (Novak & Axelrod, in press). Therefore, subsequent
studies should consider what combination of policies minimizes negative eco-
logical eﬀects while maximizing ﬁsherfolk livelihoods.
A third area for future research would be exploring the relationship between
economic and ecological changes. Our results show a lack of response to eco-
logical conditions such as CPUE change, despite ﬁshers frequently stating that
their ﬁshing decisions are driven by ﬁsh availability. Thus, future studies should
consider the market conditions under which ﬁshers respond to ﬁsh stock
abundance.
Finally, we have suggested three possible behavioral responses that would
inﬂuence the shift from artisanal to mechanized ﬁshing: (a) previously artisanal
ﬁshers investing in mechanized vessels, (b) previously artisanal ﬁshers working
as crew members on mechanized vessels, or (c) artisanal ﬁshers exiting the
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profession. The available data do not allow us to diﬀerentiate between these
explanations, but future studies should further address the underlying causal
process. Qualitative analysis would complement this study by conﬁrming how
ﬁshermen actually make decisions to increase or decrease eﬀort in the face of
global market changes.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank four anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. The
article also beneﬁtted from the helpful comments of Samuel Barkin, Arild Underdal, and
Tin Klanjscek, all of whom served as discussants for previous iterations of this study at
the 2010 and 2012 meetings of the International Studies Association. In addition, we
thank Mark Gibson, Elizabeth Havice, Sikina Jinnah, and John Kerr for excellent sug-
gestions at various stages of the research; Ayman Bari for his research assistance; and Ben
Appel, Daniel Litwok, and Pablo Pinto for discussions about statistical models.
All remaining errors are our own. Related preliminary research was also supported by
the Michigan State University Center for Water Sciences and Center for Advanced Study
of International Development.
Data were collected as a regular research activity of the Central Marine Fisheries
Research Institute, Kochi, India. The authors thank Central Marine Fisheries Research
Institute (CMFRI), Kochi and the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), New
Delhi for all their help throughout this research. Dr. Shyam S. Salim, Dr. T.V. Sathianandan,
and Dr. Somy Kuriakose contributed to this study in their personal capacity. The views
expressed are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Central Marine
Fisheries Research Institute of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conﬂicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following ﬁnancial support for the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article: Michigan State University (MSU) participants received a
small internal grant from the MSU Environmental Science and Policy Program VISTAS
Awards,whichweused forDr. Salim tovisit andmeetwith theMSUauthors in January2014.
Notes
1. As one reviewer noted, exports may also be sensitive to exchange rate shifts, with the
Rupee’s value (relative to the U.S. dollar) much lower in late 2011 than in late 2007.
However, despite exchange rate shifts, shrimp exports to the United States more
closely track the emergence and removal of anti-dumping duties over this time
period (Figure 2). We cannot control for more fine-grained exchange rate shifts
because other data are not available on the same temporal scale.
2. We obtain similar results using 2007–2010 changes, though with lower significance
levels for the nonmotorized sector, and substantively larger effects of mobile phone
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saturation. Examining 2008–2011 changes results in the same signs and similar mag-
nitude coefficients, but lower significance levels, likely because some fleet investments
began as soon as the United States agreed to begin cutting duties in mid-2008.
3. The 2005 Marine Fisheries Census did not differentiate mobile phones from other
electronic gadgets. As a result, data on mobile phone saturation are unfortunately
limited to one observation per district during this period.
4. Political influence is often strongest in inland parts of these districts (Subramanian,
2009), limiting concerns about political influence as an omitted variable that could
impact both mobile phone saturation and ability to invest in larger vessels.
5. Ideally, as one reviewer suggested, we would employ a difference-in-differences (DD)
model to rule out omitted variable bias. Unfortunately, because we cannot observe tem-
poral variation of mobile phone saturation, we cannot use the district fixed effects neces-
sary for DD. Statistical remedies for this concern are not amenable to small sample sizes.
6. One reviewer asked whether fishing rates may have responded to mobile phone access,
regardless of market changes. However, despite increasing rates of mobile phone adop-
tion in previous years, fishing nonetheless declined in some districts during that time
period. As such, mobile phones, by themselves, cannot be responsible for fishing
increases. Instead, mobile phones must have an impact in conjunction with market
shifts or some other information that fishermen acquire through these devices.
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